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Anticolonialism, Peace in Europe, or
Neutrality ?
America’s Reactions to Mussolini’s Invasion of Ethiopia
Annick Cizel
Mussolini has begun the conquest of Abyssinia […]
the Wilhelmstrasse is delighted. Either Mussolini
will stumble and get himself so heavily involved in
Africa that he will be greatly weakened in Europe,
whereupon Hitler can seize Austria, hitherto
protected by Il Duce, or he will win, defying France
and Britain, and thereupon be ripe for a tie‑up
with Hitler against the western Democracies.
Either way, Hitler wins (Shirer 43).
1 A sovereign enclave bridging the Dark Continent and the Middle East still largely under
European colonial rule, the kingdom of Abyssinia, renowned for its defeat of the Italians
at Adowa in 1896, watched over the southern shores of the Red Sea below Suez, facing
Yemen.1 Unscathed by the earlier « Scramble for Africa » and World War I carving of the
continent that left Italy in Libya, Eritrea and (southern) ‘Somalia’ ; Great Britain in Egypt,
the Sudan and (northern) British Somaliland ; and France in Djibouti, Addis Ababa had
long  sought  international  status. « Opening  the  door »  to  Theodore  Roosevelt’s
commercial  ventures  as  early  as  1903,  it  signed  a  reciprocal  trade  agreement  with
Woodrow Wilson in 1914, and joined the League of Nations in 1923 before adhering to the
Briand‑Kellogg Pact—the Treaty for the Renunciation of War—five years later. However,
by 1930 and Haile Selassie’s coronation as King of Kings, Sheba’s mythical Ethiopia had
known little else but isolation and a medieval lack of development, and its fame hardly
went beyond faint religious and Pan‑African echoes in the West Indies, South Africa, and
possibly northern urban Black America. 
2 Wilsonian  influence  had  placed  self‑determination  for  all  peoples  at  the  heart  of
international  principles  for  world  peace,  and  unintentionally  shaped  Ethiopian
exceptionalism into a prophetic model for Black sovereignty to come. Mussolini’s 1934
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war preparations for the vengeful subjugation of Ethiopia thus constituted an a‑historical
case of colonization at a time when Egypt or India, for instance, were being granted
partial self‑government from London ; it also added unilateral militarism to the interwar
Anglo‑Italian imperialist competition in and around the Abyssinian empire2. A sinister
prelude  to  the  rising  global  tensions  in  the  wake  of  German rearmament  and  joint
withdrawal with Japan from international forums, the Abyssinian campaign of 1935‑36
soon became a test case for world peace, for the ‘raison d’être’ of the League of Nations
and Kellogg Pact, as well as for American policy toward Europe and her colonial empires. 
3 The necessity to preserve the now shaky balance between world powers while being true
to  the  Wilsonian  heritage  of  concerted  international  action  and  the  democratic
imperative of basing foreign policy on domestic consent (Schlesinger, 9) proved hard to
reconcile for the new Democratic administration, whose multitudinous New Deal home
recovery programs depended on an ethnic coalition now threatened by international
divisions. Non‑membership in the League and the historical Monroe Doctrine entailed
neutrality as a matter of principle, as the Roosevelt administration was reminded by an
essentially  isolationist  Congress,  while  the  executive’s  pragmatic  belief  that  free
commercial intercourse among nations was a prerequisite to world peace and economic
recovery  called  for  mediation  and  subsequent  interference  in  the  affairs  of  Europe.
Neutrality therefore could hardly amount to disinterest and neglect, and the Abyssinian
crisis came out as a testing ground for President Roosevelt’s Democratic team’s foreign
policy, which between the December 5, 1934 early Italian encroachment into Ethiopia’s
Ogaden province and May 9, 1936 proclamation of the Italian Empire, oscillated between
moral  world  leadership  and  historical  non‑entanglement  outside  the  American
hemisphere, declared its dedication to ‘Good Neighbor’ behavior yet fell prey to European
colonial strategic interests, while having to mediate between increasingly internationally
conscious minority actors of foreign policy, in both the national and international arenas.
Condemnation Without Intervention : An Active Blend of Isolationism and Wilsonian
‘Moral Diplomacy’
4 The successive neutrality laws passed by the United States Congress between 1935 and
1941 have led to a common belief that « whatever the Administration or the public might
have wished, America could not avoid playing a secondary role to the European powers in
the  Italo‑Ethiopian  crisis »  (Henze,  53).  Indeed,  ambassador  diplomacy  relied  on  an
essentially European network for information gathering—Britain and Italy for the most
part, France and Switzerland, more rarely the Netherlands, Romania or Norway—even if
US efforts were at all times frenzied to keep channels of communication open with the
Ethiopian mainland. Referring since the fall of 1934 directly to President Roosevelt or to
Secretary of State Hull, Ambassador Long in Italy would confer personally with Mussolini,
and his colleague Wilson in Switzerland with Edvard Benes or Anthony Eden, then keep
the executive daily informed of war developments.  Likewise it appears that the State
Department at once undertook « a study of neutral rights with a view to recommending
to the President legislation redefining the attitude to be adopted by the United States in
the event of war3 » (Adams, 220). For all this apprehensive agitation however, Cordell Hull
maintained in late 1934 that US status was to be limited to that of an « observer » (FRUS
1934, 772), and by early 1936 hardly admitted going beyond « watchful waiting » (FRUS
1936, 197). Concurrently, in the wake of the first Somalia border clash at Wal Wal between
Italian  and  Ethiopian  troops,  the  US  chargé  was  commanded  to  « keep  the  [State]
Department fully informed of developments and scrupulously refrain from taking any
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action which would encourage the Ethiopian Government to request the mediation of the
United States » (FRUS 1934, 770).
5 Other witnesses of US diplomacy, however, described the US attitude differently, in their
respective attempts to pay tribute to FDR’s faith in Wilsonian « moral diplomacy », refute
absence  of  diplomatic  influence,  and condemn the  wobbliness  of  the  administration,
forever hostage to its isolationist public opinion and Congress : the Council on Foreign
Relations director Allen W. Dulles thus characterized Roosevelt’s sympathy for Ethiopia as
« benevolent  neutrality »  (Dulles,  576),  US  Ambassador  to  Italy  Breckinridge  Long
renamed it « non‑intercourse with belligerents » (FRUS 1935, 826), while FDR’s economic
adviser  Herbert  Feis’  « sympathetic  evasion »  substituted  « verbal  formulas »  for
thoughtful policies that were « independently conceived », and « designed solely to keep
the United States out of war » (Feis, 91, 95). Omnipresent in diplomatic exchanges, the
United  States  rather  appears  as  a  world  policeman  in  absentia,  whose  potential
intervention nonetheless acted as a deterrent on Mussolini :  as  the Chargé in France
reminded the Secretary of State in August 1935, « in casting about for possible support,
either moral or material, Mussolini was always relying on the hope that the United States
would remain at least indifferent or disinterested » (FRUS 1935, 736). As relayed by the US
Chargé in Ethiopia to the Department of State in October 1935, the American giant was
domestically restrained to exert  only « sympathetic interest  in the League’s  efforts »,
with its higher authority resting solely in its global « moral influence » (FRUS 1935, 776).
Thus  did  inaction  ironically  develop  into  active  diplomacy :  « [The  American  reply]
pointed out that the United States Government had taken action in advance of other
Governments,  which  ‘represents  the  independent  and  affirmative  policy  of  the
Government  of  the United States ».  In  the lofty  missionary vein of  Wilsonian ‘moral
diplomacy’, « the United States Government would use its moral influence in favour of
peace »  (Adams,  224).  This  uncommitted  form of  diplomacy  might  even  prove  more
successful in diffusing world war threats than Europe’s mounting military preparations :
« Incidentally,  it  is mentioned, in connection with American policy,  that the line you
[FDR] are understood to favor may serve to bring the Germans out in the open air so their
real attitude will become clear, » in the words of a flattering US emissary in the final days
of 1935 (FDR & FA, III, 106).
6 The  latter  report  by  the  US  Ambassador  to  Peru,  Fred  Morris  Dearing,  alarmingly
reminded  diplomatic  circles  of  the  Zimmerman  Note  of  two  decades  earlier :  « The
Italians continue to spread their propaganda and it is having its effect, » as relayed by
« the power of the Italian Bank, the Italian character of the church, the numerous Italian
colony, the wide ramifications of Italian business within the country, and above all, Latin
and racial sympathies. » In conclusion, there was no doubt that « opinion in general [was]
veering  towards  Italy »  (FDR  &  FA,  III,  106).  Echoes  could  be  heard  in  several  Latin
American embassies, as Argentina and Brazil hesitated to apply League sanctions against
Italy and Ecuador cancelled them in the spring of 1936, while the Italian representative at
Geneva « called on a number of Latin American delegations […] suggesting that the Latin
American League States adopt a common front in Geneva advocating the lifting of
sanctions  against  Italy. »  While  Mexico  alone  « urged  a  reenforcement  of  sanctions
against Italy » (FRUS 1935, 850), Chile shielded itself behind a Monroe doctrine rationale :
« …the constitution or the procedures of the League must be shortly revised so as to
exclude the participation of Latin American League members in non‑American questions
and of non‑American League members in American questions. […] Failing such action
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Chile will consider withdrawing from active participation in the League » (FRUS 1936, 117).
Would Italy’s expansionist campaign be contained in Africa if « granted a free hand »
there to preserve the status quo in Central Europe, specialists of Near‑Eastern Affairs
wondered (FRUS 1934, 769). What if « some European power were to seek, by force of arms,
a  raw material  source  in  South America » ?  The  Monroe  doctrine  lay  at  the  core  of
Roosevelt’s Abyssinian policy, as explained to the Ambassador to Germany in December
1935 : « We should have to take sides and might, without going to war ourselves, assist
the South American nations with supplies of one kind or another4 » (FDR & FA, III, 102).
7 Military neutrality and non‑entanglement in the affairs of Europe thus did not preclude
other forms of intervention, and were held high only as long as Europe did not harm
American interests. At the onset of the war, at a time when the USA drilled 40% of the
world’s  oil  wells,  the  Ethiopian  Imperial  Government  secretly  granted  the  African
Development and Exploration Corporation of Delaware, a British‑run subsidiary of the
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, a 75‑year concession in the Ogaden desert,  bordering
Italian Somalia  (Adams,  216‑17 ;  Duprey,  389‑90).  For  the  Ethiopians,  the  goal  of  the
‘Rickett concession’ was twofold : besides the expected increase in foreign earnings, its
strategic location made it a buffer zone between the westward‑bound Italian armies and
the Ethiopian capital city. The presence of American engineers there especially would
have made it  imperative for Washington to step in.  Leaks in press reports infuriated
Cordell Hull, who ordered the Standard Oil out while Roosevelt pronounced the ‘dollar
diplomacy’ dead, and reiterated his wish to be « helpful to the cause of peace », rather
than « helpful to Ethiopia », as the original dispatch ran (FDR & FA, III, 103‑104 ; FRUS 1935,
778‑84). By 1943 however, World War II made oil scarcer, and British stabilization of the
region finally made possible the reactivation of the aborted oil deal of 1935 (Spencer, 106
n.2, 146, 165).
8 With another world war looming in the distance, the Roosevelt administration chose to
depart from strict neutrality in one field, that of telecommunications, and repeatedly
debated with British authorities the possibility of stationing a special  « war vessel  in
nearby waters », off Aden, in a frantic wish to « maintain direct communication between
the station at Addis Ababa and the naval stations at Washington and Cavite, Philippine
Islands. […] The Navy was contemplating asking the Radio Corporation of America to
make arrangements with the Radio Orient at Beirut to relay messages to and from Addis
Ababa » (FRUS 1935, 890). Indeed, as soon as Eritrea was secured by British forces in 1942,
Washington initiated negotiations over ‘Radio Marina’, sheltered from magnetic storms
by its geographical location in a zone « where the limited seasonal variations between
sunrise and sunset reduced the need for numerous frequency changes », a strategic move
which mirrored  US  policy  in  Abyssinia  in  1935‑36,  and  ever  since ;  as  John Spencer
remembers it, Radio Marina, indeed, « had little to do with either Ethiopia or Africa »
(Spencer, 262).
9 On the face of it though, and with much publicity both at home and abroad, neutrality
expressed itself in recurrent American refusals to act as a mediator in the Italo‑Ethiopian
conflict. Addis took the lead in requesting American arbitration, first in mid‑December
1934, then on July 3, 1935 in the name of the Kellogg Pact, and again by mid‑September (
FRUS 1934, 769‑70 ; Gantenbein, 133 ; FRUS 1935, 751)5. While the Italian press praised the
American government’s  awareness of  « the futility of  any effort  to arrest  Mussolini’s
resolute  and  upright  action, »  an  « attitude  which  ha[d]  served  to  moderate  British
policy » (FRUS 1935, 729), London « could not refrain from expressing the hope that […]
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the United States government could impress upon Mussolini the inevitable tragedy which
would result from his making war on Abyssinia » (FRUS 1935, 613). On August 18, under
Anglo‑French  pressure,  Cordell  Hull  partially  gave  in  and  transmitted  a  « personal
message » to Il Duce, « at the direction of the President, » urging him to resolve « the
controversy  between  Italy  and  Ethiopia  […]  without  resort  to  armed  conflict. »  A
disputable breach of neutrality pledges, this message was not to be released to the press,
however (FRUS 1935, 739). 
10 Similarly,  individual  action  by  grassroots  Americans  was  banned :  since  the  Addis
government granted citizenship to skilled Black expatriates willing to contribute to the
technical and economic development of the empire, African‑Americans were forbidden to
join  the  ranks  of  the  Ethiopian  army,  their  passports  denied  and  US  citizenship
threatened (Plummer, 39, 43). The selection of a US citizen, Pitman Benjamin Potter, as
one of Ethiopia’s emissaries to the League was accompanied by a denial in the New York
Times of  his  being recommended by the  State  Department  (FRUS  1935,  602) ;  John H.
Spencer, who was then beginning a thirty‑year term as legal and foreign policy adviser to
the Ethiopian Emperor, kept his appointment confidential at first, « to shield [the DOS]
from the fear of becoming even indirectly involved in the conflict » (Spencer, 26, n. to p.
8). Conversely, requests for a visit by Haile Selassie were diplomatically turned down, and
« confidentially, » « the [State] Department consider[ed] that the visit of any Ethiopian
official or personage to the United States at [that] time for the avowed purpose of raising
funds [was] highly undesirable and should be prevented if possible » (FRUS 1936, 217).
11 Throughout the period 1934‑36, US diplomacy thus showed little evolution in the face of
mounting world war threats,  other than verbal alarm at the ominous concurrence of
events in separate hemispheres, in Western Europe, Africa, South America, Japan and
China.  By  December  1935,  Cordell  Hull  assessed that  « the  Ethiopian‑Italian war  had
[made] itself the most serious single factor in precipitating the Japanese‑Chinese crisis »,
and underlined « the steadily increasing danger of its spreading and thus involving other
nations, and, of course, increasing the danger of [the USA] becoming involved » (FRUS
1935,  868‑69).  The  Rome‑Tokyo  Axis  to  be  was  lurking  in  the  Treaty  of  Amity  and
Commerce signed by Ethiopia and Japan on November 4, 1930, which soon multiplied
Japanese firms in Ethiopia and paved the way for the opening of a legation in the spring
of 1936 (Duprey, 477‑78 ; Spencer, 37). For the time being, however, ‘Monroeism’ focused
US concern on Latin America, delegating colonial issues in the Middle East and Africa to
the arbitration of European colonial powers. The League of Nations directorate—English,
French, then Belgian6—dramatically evoked colonial interests before self‑determination,
and  the  Roosevelt  administration’s  aloofness  reflected  an  ideological  and  economic
domestic imperative : preserve a European balance of « great powers » favorable to the
values of « civilization » shared by the US, and avoid « the complete slowing down and
almost the stopping in its tracks of the Trade Agreements program for the restoration of
international  finance  and trade to  their  normal  volume,  on account  of  the  fear  and
uncertainty of businessmen engendered by the war » (Sumner Welles, FDR & FA, 14, 223 ;
Cordell  Hull,  FRUS 1935,  869).  Regardless of the ‘spirit  of 76’  that inspired Democratic
anticolonial policies, a status quo on European spheres of interest was imperative for the
time being, to bolster an uneasy peace coalition against German rearmament and Benito
Mussolini’s ambiguous declarations of intent, as reported by Breckinridge Long to Cordell
Hull in May 1935 : « It is precisely in order to be fully prepared in Europe that we intend
to protect ourselves from the rear in Africa » (FRUS 1935, 601).
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A Eurocentric Case for Self‑Determination
12 The  carousel  of  European  dispatches  through  which  the  Roosevelt  administration
indirectly witnessed the invasion and subsequent subjection of Ethiopia to fascist Italy
reflected  the  eurocentric  tradition  of  American  diplomatic  channels,  regarding  both
information gathering and staff. The 19th century European‑inspired division between
‘great powers’  and ‘small  states’  still  presided over international relations,  and peace
negotiations entailed individual representation, testifying to the ideological failure of the
Wilsonian perspective on ‘collective security’. Thus did the Laval‑Mussolini agreements of
January  1935  and  the  Hoare‑Laval  resolution  of  December  confirm  the  authority  of
European colonial powers over the Ethiopian legal case for self‑determination. As the US
Consul to Geneva put it to Cordell Hull in the first days of that year, « the attitude of the
Secretariat Political Section has been to discount the Abyssinian claims, expressing the
view that the question should not be brought before the League. The representatives of
the small states deprecate such tendencies, stating that the recent assumption of League
control by the great powers should not result in any hindrance to small states being
heard » (FRUS 1935, 594).
13 We can see little of the idealistic anticolonialism that pushed its way into the Atlantic
Charter in August 1941 in the American attitude toward Ethiopia in the mid‑thirties. As it
would before Stalin and international communism after the war, anticolonialism had to
bow to greater  perils,  and the Democratic  administration had to adapt  to  pragmatic
imperatives.  Bent on destabilizing the Red Sea region and the British Empire,  Italian
propaganda in Egypt had intensified, spread by « a large colony of citizens which [were]
organized according to Fascist groups, » while the Italian media pressed for Egyptian
independence. The US ambassador to Italy, indeed, warned the President that, to him,
there was no doubt that the Italians would « be trouble‑makers in Africa and attempt to
connect  Libya  and Ethiopia.  Across  the  Red  Sea,  they  [would]  try  to  reinforce  their
friendly relations with the Iman of Yemen and fortify him in his opposition to King Ibn
Saud, the King of Arabia with the object of controlling that at present unoccupied and
independent  country.  […]  They  [would]  entrench themselves  in  Ethiopia  before  they
venture[d] to other fields » (FDR & FA, III, 3‑5). London might find itself in a quandary, and
subsequently « withdraw from cooperation on the Continent and seek to safeguard its
Empire. […] The dangers mentioned were a possible race riot from Cairo to the Cape ; the
threat to the headwaters of the Blue Nile ; the threat to the route to India. » Colonial
rivalries thus might curtail London’s role as guardian of the Eastern Mediterranean and
the gates to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, and strategically and economically
weaken such democratic bulwarks as Britain and France : « particularly from the French
point of view [there existed] the danger of bolstering Nazi strength in Austria which
might follow in the wake of Italian preoccupation in Abyssinia7 » (FRUS 1935, 626‑27). The
international  rationale  for  the  Italo‑Ethiopian  War  unquestionably  was
self‑determination,  but  that  of  European  nations  in  and  out  of  their  empires.  Haile
Selassie’s British exile in Bath after the Italian victory thus marked a doubly ironical
acknowledgment of Ethiopian rights to national sovereignty, with the outcome of a 1941
British liberation taking the form of the annexation of Eritrea to the Ethiopian empire.
14 Hardly a decade before African decolonization, U.S. Chargés in European capitals pictured
Mussolini’s Ethiopian venture « in the shape of a contest between the black and white
races, »  aimed  at  « reconstruct[ing]  the  old  Roman  Empire »  at  the  expense  of
« backward » Abyssinia8 (FRUS 1935, 613, 633, 595). Even though running contrary to the
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course  of  history,  the  Italian  undertaking  could  nevertheless  rely  on  a  widespread
ethnocentric judgment of the Ethiopians, and belief in the benefits of colonial guidance.
In November 1934, in a manner reminiscent of the White Man’s Burden as applied to the
Philippines for over a quarter century, the American chargé in Addis, W. Perry George,
epitomized « the practical effects that an Italian occupation of Ethiopia might have » :
economic development, including an outlet to the sea, control of slavery, modernization
of communications, more security along British colonial frontiers, notwithstanding the
fact  that  « Italy  would  come  into  possession  of  a  vast,  fertile  colony,  not  only
self‑sustaining  but  easily  capable  of  contributing  to  the  active  side  of  Italy’s  trade
balance. » The only drawbacks then listed highlighted the potential threat to the French
and British neighboring colonies (FRUS 1934, 762‑64). In March 1939, Under‑Secretary of
State Sumner Welles pondered over Ethiopia’s fate, reminiscing that « most of our people
said ‘of course it is too bad. But what goes on in a remote and uncivilized corner of distant
Africa can never affect us’ » (FDR & FA, 14, 221). A month later, FDR gave a new breath to
America’s ‘civilizing mission’ during a press conference before members of the American
Society of Newspaper Editors :
Well, you can pass up Ethiopia—they were pretty wild people in Ethiopia, they were
not very highly civilized from our point of view ;  maybe they would have come
under the definition of what President Wilson, I think, acceded to in 1919 in talking
about backward nations, but I often wonder what right, inherent right, you and I
have got to call any nation backward. […] Are they wholly uncivilized people ? I
wonder. Anyway, their independence is gone. There is nothing much we can do
about it except to maintain in our diplomatic relations, perhaps only as a gesture, a
gesture of not recognizing the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia. The gesture has
been made and history will record that the protest was made and lived up to for
about four years (FDR & FA, 14, 387).
15 While  the  League  of  Nations  still  debated  the  appropriateness  of  placing  economic
sanctions on the two belligerents9, as moral « gestures », Washington initiated a selective
embargo on « arms, ammunition and implements of war » on October 5, 1935 (FDR PP 4,
412‑16). Overall exports to and imports from Italy and Ethiopia, however, were neither
prohibited nor even limited. The President felt it his « high moral duty » to « urge » the
American people  « against  profiteering in  the  war  between Italy  and Ethiopia »,  and
recommended  that  they  « restrict  their  exports  of  essential  war  materials  to  either
belligerent to approximately the normal peace‑time basis. » Thus « it [could] not be said
that they [were] seizing new opportunities for profit or that by changing their peace‑time
trade they [gave] aid to the continuation of the war10 » (FDR PP 5, 90). In view of the
absence  of  legislative  constraints  on  US  corporations,  Secretary  of  State  Hull  was
similarly left with publicly lamenting increased exports of strategic materials (Renwick,
109 n. 14).
16 Even though pre‑war US trade with Addis Ababa hardly reached half a million dollars, the
Italians nonetheless complained that « the Ford Motor Company [was] furnishing to the
Ethiopian Government large quantities of motor cars for military use » ; the acquisition of
ambulance planes was denied, aircraft sale being specifically prohibited (Henze, 51 ; FRUS
1935, 784, 811). More significantly, the Johnson Act of April 13, 1934 forbade « the granting
of loans or credits by private citizens or corporations to the Italian Government », while
the Export‑Import Bank « declined to approve credits in connection with the shipment of
products  to  Italy »,  and  Italian  assets  and  banking  operations  in  the  United  States
underwent Treasury scrutiny (FRUS 1935, 770, 810)11. Roosevelt’s « moral embargo » never
explicitly referred to oil as an « implement of war », yet Rome’s war needs and boycott of
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British Shell increased demand on US companies, whom Italian « individual automobile
owners »  actively  « patronized12 »  (FRUS  1935,  814).  The  Council  on  Foreign  Relations
journal Foreign Affairs could not but acknowledge that « American exporters were making
record sales to Italy […] in spite of the Administration’s efforts at moral suasion. » If
League members such as Britain and the Soviet Union chose to uphold oil shipments to
Italy13, their sales decreased in the course of 1935, while the US part of Italy’s total oil
imports rose by 12.5% for the whole year, to reach a record 17.8% for the war months of
October‑December  (Scroggs,  524‑25).  While  Federal  agencies  relayed  the  executive’s
moral condemnation of Italy, threatened to release the names of the latter’s oil suppliers,
and curtailed credit‑lending facilities, a fear that private business interests « might have
objected »  to  further  restrictive  action—admitting  domestic  economic  recovery  took
second place in government policy to a colonial  conflict  in distant Africa—held back
executive wrath,« especially when there was a chance of gaining permanent markets for
American oil » (Bonn, 358 ; Parrish, 451‑52).
17 If the total value of United States exports to Italy between November 1934 and June 1936
hardly increased—French exports were cut by more than half, British almost by ten, Swiss
by one third (Renwick, 95)—exports of non‑metallic minerals, including oil, rose by 50.8%,
metals  and manufactures by 45.5%,  machinery and vehicles by 10.3% (Renwick,  97)14.
While, indeed, overall US‑Italy trade exchanges kept to « normal peacetime levels, » the
sectorial breakdown highlights the American corporate blow to League sanctions which
helped intensify state controls over Italian production and foreign exchange controls
and, beside substantial gold sales and lira devaluation, eventually hurt Rome’s economic
war effort by a mere ‑1.7% of GNP (Renwick, 22 ; Hufbauer, 62).
18 Subjected to brutal fascist rule and lethal gas, Ethiopia for all that self‑serving neutrality
attained martyr status in people’s minds, and Haile Selassie that of a hero, despite his
noted lack of military preparedness and subsequent flight into exile. As Brenda Gayle
Plummer assessed it, « like no other issue of the era, the Italo‑Ethiopian War […] prepared
the ground for anticolonial protest in the next decade » (Plummer, 51), and most vocally
so in the African‑American community, whose foreign policy consciousness grew on a
monthly basis. Even if emotional support movements were on the wane by February 1936
following Abyssinia’s military defeat while the Spanish Civil War kindled a new brand of
political activism, the lessons were not lost on Black elites in America, who in New York
City  in  1937  established  the  Council  on  African  Affairs,  « the  first  African‑American
organization created for the express purpose of lobbying to affect policy toward Africa »
(De Conde, 108). That same year, the Ethiopian World Federation began to reach out to a
Pan‑African diaspora from New York to the Caribbean and Latin America. By 1938, « the
significance  for  African‑Americans  of  the  global  crisis  then  occurring »  motivated
Socialist  leader  A.  Philip  Randolph,  churchman Channing Tobias,  Max Yergan of  the
Council on African Affairs, Will Pickens and Marion Cuthbert of the NAACP, Rev. William
L. Imes of the Presbyterian Church, Mary McLeod Bethune of the National Council of
Negro Women, and Dr. Julian Lewis of the University of Chicago to meet in Washington
(Plummer,  55,  31).  In  its  violent  opposition  to  the  oftentimes  neighboring
Italian‑American community, this rising and internationally‑conscious African‑American
elite  differed  little  in  its  assessment  of  Ethiopia’s  degree  of  ‘civilization.’  As  Stefano
Luconi  has pointed out,  the reappropriation of  a white identity by Italian Americans
frequently  « reduced  ethnic  disputes  to  matters  of  race, »  as  part  of  a  process  of
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« reethnicization » that he has demonstrated to have actually preceded World War II
(Luconi 1999, 143). 
The Minority Voices of Foreign Policy 
19 The  variety  of  ethnic  action  and  clashes  that  accompanied  the  Italian  invasion  of
Abyssinia in northeastern American cities has been largely documented, showing these
racial interactions as so many cracks in the Democratic ethnic coalition. Ongoing Black
segregation at home despite progressive Federal policies seemed as token a response as
« benevolent neutrality » in this 20th‑century renewed ‘scramble’ for the Horn of Africa.
In their quest for an improved status and americanness denied the previous generation,
Italian Americans discovered « the equation of whiteness, regardless of ethnicity with
Americanism. » As « White Americans, » « they were free to either embrace or discard
obvious  indicators  of  ethnic  origin, »  something  « Black  Americans  could  not »
(Plummer,  35).  Such  enduring  hierarchies  at  home left  little  psychological  room for
African Americans to try and modify socio‑political behavior on a global scale : at a time
when talks  of  ‘civilizing’  their  African  kin  were  still  rampant,  the  1919  Pan‑African
Congress had failed to include the principle of « equality of nations » on its agenda, a
principle which was also left out of the Covenant of the League of Nations (Plummer, 17) ;
in 1935 still, Anthony Eden observed « that he could not persuade the small states that
they had a real responsibility in carrying out the Covenant nor could he yet disabuse
them of the idea that this would be a matter exclusively decided by the Great Powers » (
FRUS 1935, 640). 
20 International  diplomatic networks matched the American foreign policy apparatus in
responding to an ethnically pre‑defined modus operandi, patterned on Western European
traditions for the most part. W. D. Hubbard, US news correspondent in Ethiopia, thus
regretfully signified the eurocentric ideological shackles of foreign policy‑making :  « I
admired Haile Selassie immensely. […] Nevertheless, I firmly believed that it wasn’t right
that Whites should be defeated in Africa. […] Any advance […] in Africa must be under the
domination and leadership of the White race » (Duggan & Lafore, 125). For W.E.B. Du Bois
reflecting  on « the  Ethiopian crisis »,  European interests  had molded ideological  and
political bias, and imperialism found its justification in racism : « The belief that racial
and color differences made exploitation of  colonies necessary and justifiable was too
tempting to withstand. As a matter of fact, the opposite was the truth ; namely, that the
profit  from  exploitation  was  the  main  reason  for  the  belief  in  race  difference »
(Du Bois, 84). 
21 Thus did the « general impression » spread that Ethiopian « diplomacy was not in good
hands » (FRUS 1935, 622), and that the Imperial Ethiopian Government was ‘unfit’ for such
international position : its delegates delivered « lengthy » addresses (FRUS 1935, 716), and
the Emperor himself was hopeless at foreign languages, making his appeal to the League
in Amharic when French had been called for, or reading a speech in a CBS radio broadcast
in such broken English its meaning was lost on most ; his son‑in‑law, on a pre‑war White
House visit FDR recollected, « could not speak English » either (Spencer, 74‑75 ; FDR & FA
XIV, 387).  The Foreign Office branded the Ethiopians as « incapable of respecting any
agreements which [were] not imposed and backed by force » (FRUS 1935, 638). Moreover,
Ethiopia had possibly initiated the conflict, according to an August 1935 State Department
memorandum which read « …the outbreak of armed conflict between Italy and Ethiopia
and Italy15 » (FRUS 1934, 763 ; FDR & FA II, 601). Indeed, Cordell Hull had come to consider
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by mid‑1934 that the Addis government showed so little civility to State officials posted
there that he contemplated canceling all diplomatic representation (FRUS 1934, 778).
22 
Elitist judgment grew more conciliatory with time however, as appeasement towards Italy
was disavowed in larger circles. Embassy and newspaper reports grew milder, praising
the Empress’s heart‑rending radio interviews, desperate efforts by Ethiopian emissaries
to organize relief funds and petitions to the League of Nations, or college courses on
Ethiopian history emphasizing the biblical heritage of the Orthodox Coptic Church. In a
surprisingly lyrical vein, even if not quite as eloquently as in Black poet Langston Hughes’
‘Ballad of Ethiopia’, the new US chargé in Addis honored Haile Selassie’s resilience : « His
frail  body seemed perhaps  a  trifle  frailer  and his  thoughtful  deepset  eyes  showed a
profoundly perturbed soul. But his handshake had its usual firmness and his inscrutable
features were lit up by the same winsome smile » (De Conde, 107 ; FRUS 1936, 63). 
23 Popular sentiment predominantly sided with the down‑trodden, and Italy was perceived
by most as « a bully » : « American opinion was hostile to the Italian venture from the
very start. […] For Ethiopia there has been sympathy all along, and even when the public
was reminded of slavery and other horrors that exist in Ethiopia, the reaction was not of
any  particular  importance. »  Anticolonial  feeling  combined  with  anti‑European
isolationism, and the condemnation of the Hoare‑Laval proposals that pretended to seal
the  Ethiopians’  fate  without  consulting  them  was  « unanimous,  complete  and
unequivocal »  (Adams,  222,  225).  As  an  electoral  body  and  with  the  November  1936
presidential  elections  in  sight,  the  ‘silent  majority’  thus  left  « no  latitude »  to  the
Roosevelt administration to « do more » (FDR & FA III, 106).
24 Concurrently though, Pan‑African Black organizations, women’s, students’, peace groups,
Protestant,  Jewish  and  even  Irish‑American  Catholic  associations  daily  sprang  up  to
defend  Ethiopia  against  Italian  aggression16.  Lobbying  voices  tore  across  the  whole
spectrum of US society. A week before the August 1935 neutrality bill was signed into law,
the  US  Consul  at  Basel  vibrantly  urged  his hesitant  administration  to  support  a
strong‑fisted blockade against Italy, in a manner anticipating the domino theory :
Italy must win in Africa or the Duce gradually falls. […] England is fully aware of her
decline in case Mussolini succeeds. […] In case Italy does collapse after prolonged
warfare, Nazi regime will move into Balkan zone at will. […] All opinion agrees the
League is about dead. If England does nothing her decline begins and dictatorial
Europe will hardly be limited. The only chance of more democracy in the world
depends on the blockade of warring Italy. Washington may be interested in this (
FRUS 1935, 636).
25 Two  weeks  earlier,  a  Harlem  rally  sponsored  by  the  Provisional  Committee  for  the
Defense  of  Ethiopia  and  the  American  League  Against  Fascism  had  gathered  25,000
demonstrators, under the leadership of Roy Wilkins from the NAACP, future Congressman
Adam Clayton  Powell,  Jr.,  labor  leader  A.  Philip  Randolph,  Lester  Granger  from the
National Urban League and University Professor William Pickens (Plummer, 46). Back in
April,  the  NAACP  had  telegraphed  the  League  of  Nations  on  behalf  of  « 12,000,000
American Negroes, » demanding action to restrain dictator Benito Mussolini’s threatened
invasion (De Conde, 107). For the sake of « strict neutrality », a variety of international
lawyers and businessmen joined in January 1936 to defeat the Pittman‑Reynolds bill that
aimed at extending the August 31, 1935 embargo legislation to limit exports of « essential
war  materials  other  than  arms,  ammunition  and  implements  of  war,  to  ‘normal
quantities’ » to be determined according to a given period of years before the war (FDR PP
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4, 91)17. In this election year, Italian‑American lobbying proved especially organized, with
fascist group members across the country writing five circular letters each, one to the
President,  one  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  one  to  each  of  their  Senators  and
Representatives (Luconi 2000, 137). The California Seamen’s Union succeeded for a while
in delaying all West Coast departures in case the vessels carried strategic materials for
Italy.  The  Provisional  Committee  for  the  Defense  of  Ethiopia,  a  Popular  Front
organization combining communist and non‑affiliated members, organized a 3,000‑strong
rally in March 1935 (Plummer, 50, 53). Even though most vocal in Harlem and Chicago,
the African‑American protest movement was not limited to urban America, and opened
chapters in Mississippi, Ohio, Virginia, Indiana, and Alabama (Plummer, 47‑48). Though
bypassed by Italian‑American individual donations to the Italian Red Cross, the American
Red Cross raised more money for Ethiopia than all support groups combined (FRUS 1935,
884‑85, 888, 895‑96).
26 The latter example actually questions the validity of a purely dichotomic ethnic analysis
of popular support for one of the belligerents or the other, as socio‑economic factors
obviously also defined patterns of allegiance or dissent. Black efforts, dynamic as they
were—army volunteers were barred from enlisting in Ethiopian ranks, as noted earlier—,
stumbled on the very economic deficiencies that made them a prime target for New Deal
reform. The boycott of Italian‑American stores signified just as much resentment at what
was  deemed  these  immigrants’  (relative)  economic  success ;  of  course,  most
Italian‑American workers in reality found « the preservation of  the New Deal—rather
than  US  foreign  policy  toward  Italy—[their]  primary  concern, »  and  Italy’s  renewed
colonial  glory  « potential  compensation  for  decades  of  intolerance  and  ethnic
discrimination » (Luconi, 1999, 137 ; 2000, 136). If isolationist tendencies seemed to cut
across the board within the dominant White group, socialists and communists attempted
to reorient inter‑ethnic strife toward a common struggle against imperialism. Similarly, a
closer  look  at  the  Black  community  showed  a  minority  bourgeoisie  objecting  to  US
intervention in the conflict (Plummer, 42, 47) ; so with the (African‑) American Committee
on the Ethiopian Crisis, established in 1935, whose name professed ecumenical patriotism
rather than ethnic identification and separation. 
27 Thus  did  ethnic,  ideological  and  socio‑economic  divisions  tear  at  the  Democratic
coalition, and both the President and Secretary of State repeatedly resorted to timely
press releases, as an appeasement gesture to domestic agitation ; two weeks before the
August 1935 embargo resolution Cordell Hull hence advised his president that « public
knowledge of the position of the Administration in regard to this matter would, I believe,
serve a useful purpose at this time » (FDR & FA II, 605). The series of diplomatic dispatches
covering the years 1934‑36 shows the whole crisis  as  being systematically monitored
personally by the Secretary of State, as African or even Middle Eastern affairs have rarely
been, oftentimes referring to his President, and at all times trying to keep the foreign
policy  process  active  rather  than  submit  to  congressional  isolationism.  This
preponderance  of  the  executive,  even  though  characteristic  of  Roosevelt’s  ‘imperial
presidency,’ was however paradoxically moderated by the momentary popular upsurge
brought about by the conflict which the administration had to constantly keep in check,
signifying perhaps to United States leaders at large that America could no longer ‘return
to normalcy,’ and that the time for the ‘American Century’ had come.
Conclusion
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28 The  Abyssinian  crisis  of  the  mid‑thirties  constituted  a  symbolic  case  of  unequal
diplomacy, sternly prefiguring postcolonial third world struggles hardly more egalitarian
when protected by the now globally representative United Nations. The national interest
of « Great Powers » would again define priorities on behalf of the new nations, under
principles such as those of ‘premature independence’ placing the protection of strategic
shorelines and raw materials under the aegis of Western powers regardless of the Dark
Continent’s  internationally  recognized  right  to  self‑determination.  The  obsolete
‘civilizing mission’ of the colonial White Man’s Burden developed against Nazi and fascist
backgrounds into a more enlightened democratic mission against totalitarianism, a more
palatable rationale characteristic of the ‘free world’. Hence did Britain grant Ethiopia her
sovereignty back, « acquitt[ing] herself gracefully in the eyes of the Black races of her
Empire as the protector of their rights, without so materially assisting the Ethiopians as
to lead to the defeat of the White forces, » as related to Roosevelt by the U.S. Minister to
Norway in February 1936, at the crux of what was not yet a European conflict (FDR & FA
III, 212)18.
29 Ethiopia  perhaps  asserted  her  exceptionalism  here  once  again,  as  her  sovereignty
recovered as early in the world war as 1941 enabled historians to endlessly ponder over
Italian ‘colonization’  or  ‘occupation’—as most  Ethiopians would have it  today—of  the
Abyssinian empire. The lessons in negotiations were learned, that made the annexation of
Eritrea a diplomatic success, even if a mixed blessing which, in the wake of the Cold War,
granted the empire enough strategic value for it to become a prize for superpower rivalry
for another half‑century. 
30 Paradoxically enough, the liberation of Ethiopia by British forces also highlighted the
inevitable  globalization  of  Washington’s  foreign  commitments  at  the  expense  of  its
« special » ally. By August 1942 already, the United States operated a host of projects in
Abyssinia under the authority of 336 military personnel and 2,829 civilians, and the newly
reopened Bank of Ethiopia was issuing ‘Ethiopian dollars’ under the guidance of George A.
Blowers,  the former governor of  the Bank of  Monrovia  in Liberia  (Marcus  1983,  13 ;
Spencer 105). A year later, the British military mandate over the region authorized the
extension of Lend‑Lease, and Ethiopia, grateful for US non‑recognition of Italian rule and
support for the ‘return’ of Eritrea, volunteered to undergo a model economic recovery
program, soon supplemented by the signature with Washington on August 9, 1943 of a
first mutual aid agreement. As in the case of lend‑lease, the value of such aid was to be
publicized, especially the « conditions and long‑term advantages mutually profitable to
the United States and Ethiopia and favorable to world peace » (Duprey 489‑90). Thus did
Ethiopia,  in the words of  a  US Consul,  become « an experimental  center for aid and
reconstruction operations » until the early 1960s (Marcus 1983, 16 ; Cizel), with New Deal
relief programs inspiring the management and promotion of multilateral international
economic  relations  and  development  favorable  to  the  global  liberalization  of  trade
exchanges the Roosevelt administration had willed as a Good Neighbor policy.
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NOTES
1. The research for this article was made possible in part thanks to a grant from the
Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, the Netherlands.
2. For the Ethiopian denunciation before the League of Nations of these Anglo‑Italian
economic spheres of influence agreed on at the expense of the empire’s national
sovereignty, see Duprey 444‑46 & 453‑61.
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3. Harold G. Marcus similarly situates the Ethiopian awareness of Italy’s early military
preparations in September 1934 (Marcus 1994, 139).
4. The prospect of Venezuela enabling the Italians to counter oil embargoes by
« eliminating » the United States « as an important factor in the embargo problem » could
not be omitted either (FRUS 1936 107). A Joint Resolution of Congress formally
« reaffirmed the principles of the Monroe Doctrine » on April 10, 1941.
5. In the spring of 1939, Emperor Haile Selassie kept calling on the US President to
consider « using his great influence to secure the restoration to [his] people of their
freedom and complete independence » (FDR & FA 14, 413).
6. The French owned the sole railway linking the Red Sea port of Djibouti to Addis Ababa,
hence the economic reins to the Ethiopian economy, while the Royal House of Belgium
was linked by marriage to that of Italy (Spencer 35, 73).
7. The main tributary to the Egyptian Nile, the Blue Nile, originates in Lake Tana, in the
Ethiopian highlands.
8. William R. Scott’s account of The Sons of Sheba’s Race : African‑Americans and the
Italo‑Ethiopian War, 1935‑1941 shows in the chapter devoted to « The Hamite Controversy »
how the Amhara tribe—Haile Selassie’s—views itself as « White » and displays
ethnocentric behavior similar to that of Europeans towards the dark‑skinned Ethiopians
(Scott 192‑207). UNIA leader Marcus Garvey certainly did not expect such a color line when
he was slighted by the Emperor he was visiting in his British exile.
9. For the first time in the League’s history, a selection of economic sanctions—barring oil
—was adopted on October 19, to be enforced only by November 18, 1935.
10. A press‑released statement had already been issued in October 1935, in which FDR
pretended not to « believe that the American people [would] wish for abnormally
increased profits that temporarily might be secured by greatly extending our trade in
such materials » (Gantenbein, 136).
11. The Treasury Department claimed impartiality since the Ethiopians had neither assets
nor vessels worth monitoring.
12. Ambassador to Italy Long went on to report a similar Italian boycott of Egyptian and
Indian—hence British—cotton : they « were now buying American cotton exclusively and
committed as a matter of business policy and out of friendship to the United States to
continue their exclusive purchases of American cotton in the future. »
13. Soviet oil shipments were largely compensated for by an increase in coal, grain and
lumber deliveries (Plummer 49).
14. The overall trade balance was compensated for by a sharp decrease in textile fibres
and manufactures (‑30.3%), unmanufactured cotton (‑30%), wood and paper (‑29.6%), and
animals and animal products (‑67.6%) (Renwick 97).
15. Deleted words and italics in original.
16. Black Ethiopianist churches took the lead, but more ecumenical efforts voiced their
protest as well, such as John Foster Dulles’ Federal Council of Churches. American Jews
sided with the Ethiopian Falashas, while Irish‑American Catholics mainly objected to
imperialism, thus casting a different vote than the bulk of the American Catholic
community, less immune to the Vatican’s ambiguous attitude toward Mussolini and
fascism.
17. The hastily passed February 29, 1936 law merely proclaimed the extension of the arms
embargo until May 1, 1937, and reiterated the prohibition of loans and credits to
belligerent governments.
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18. As a symbolic gesture, the liberation of Addis Ababa was staged with the returned
Emperor marching ahead of British troops.
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